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Many of the 179 active federal appeals court judgeships authorized by 
Congress have remained vacant for protracted times. Over the last 
dozen years, the appellate system has experienced numerous openings, 
which have generally comprised ten percent of those seats. Particular 
tribunals' situations have been worse. At various times since 1996, the 
United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, and Ninth 
Circuits operated without a third of their judges. However, the most 
egregious and recent illustration is the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit. Almost half of that court's positions are now 
empty, while a number of its seats have been unfilled for extensive 
periods. 
Judicial appointments to the Sixth Circuit have proven highly 
controversial, eliciting accusations and countercharges among Senate 
members who represent states located in that circuit. For example, 
Senator Spencer Abraham (R-MI) prevented Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearings for years on two Michigan women whom President Bill Clinton 
nominated. This delay required that Judge Helene White wait longer 
than any person in American history without receiving Senate 
consideration. Michigan Democratic Senators Carl Levin and Debbie 
Stabenow responded to the delay first by requesting hearings on the 
Clinton nominees or the creation of a bipartisan judicial selection 
commission. When President George W. Bush rebuffed these overtures 
by submitting four Michigan nominees, Levin and Stabenow then 
blocked their Senate consideration. Democrats in the upper chamber 
also apparently found both Ohioans whom the chief executive proposed 
on May 9, 2001 so conservative that the Judiciary Committee in the 107th 
Congress accorded neither individual a hearing. 
Political phenomena substantially explain these machinations. For 
instance, the court's active judges comprise similar numbers of 
Republican and Democratic appointees, who frequently split along party 
lines when addressing disputed public policy issues, such as abortion 
and religious freedom. Moreover, Grand Old Party (GOP) politicians 
may well view the tribunal's vacancies as an opportunity to have 
Republican.presidents name a majority of its members. The propositions 
in this paragraph received public expression in the opinions resolving 
the University of Michigan affirmative action case, Grutter v. Bollinger, 
which included stinging allegations of procedural manipulation to 
influence the substantive result and equally vociferous denials. 1 
' Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002). 
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Six of the Sixth Circuit's sixteen positions are currently open. The 
Judicial Conference, the federal courts' policymaking arm, has suggested 
that Congress approve two new seats for the tribunal. Empirical data on 
dockets and workloads substantiate these recommendations. Chief 
Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr. has correspondingly asserted to the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts 
that the Sixth Circuit caseload warrants additional positions. 
Nonetheless, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA), the subcommittee's then-
chair, authored a 1999 report which contended that the appeals court 
functions well using its present judicial complement. 
However, there is evidence that the tribunal performs less 
efficaciously than some of the twelve regional circuits. For example, 
most appellate courts provide greater percentages of published opinions 
than does the Sixth Circuit. Moreover, no tribunal relies so heavily on 
visiting judges to constitute panels. The Sixth Circuit also decides 
appeals more slowly than any other appellate court except the one with 
the largest docket. Sixth Circuit vacancies have even necessitated 
cancellation of oral arguments, which imposes unnecessary expense and 
delay on the tribunal, judges, counsel, and parties. 
All of the above ideas suggest that federal judicial appointments to the 
Sixth Circuit have grown increasingly controversial and deserve 
analysis, which this essay undertakes. Part One explores the origins and 
development of the problems that have accompanied Sixth Circuit 
judicial selection. Part Two evaluates numerous potential remedies for 
the difficulties affecting appointments which the first segment identifies. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Introduction 
The historical background of the complications in Sixth Circuit federal 
judicial selection seems to require somewhat limited assessment here 
because the existing circumstances appear most important. 
Nevertheless, considerable examination is appropriate, as it can improve 
understanding of the Sixth Circuit and of the problems related to its 
appointments. Moreover, analyzing only the background which directly 
involves the Sixth Circuit may seem most relevant. However, 
developments in this court cannot be separated from those elsewhere, so 
that evaluating national phenomena helps clarify the Sixth Circuit's 
situation. For instance, the ongoing Michigan dispute resembles one 
which is continuing in North Carolina. Four North Carolinians 
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nominated by Clinton never received Judiciary Committee hearings. 
Moreover, North Carolina's Democratic senator has precluded 
consideration of a Bush appeals court nominee from North Carolina. 
The Second, Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits have had many vacancies 
at different times since the mid-1990s. Republican Senate members also 
might have considered several Clinton designees for the Ninth Circuit 
too liberal just as Democratic senators could find some Bush nominees 
for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits overly conservative. Therefore, the 
Sixth Circuit may not be typical, but attempts to appoint judges for the 
tribunal have encountered difficulties that resemble those in other 
courts. 
B. National Developments 
National developments implicating Sixth Circuit judicial selection are 
subtle and complex. It might appear that these developments need 
relatively little treatment here because they have received rather 
comprehensive analysis elsewhere.2 Nonetheless, comparatively 
thorough assessment can enhance understanding. The national problem 
involving appointments has two major components. The first is the 
persistent vacancies dilemma, which resulted from Congress' 
enlargement of federal court jurisdiction and the dramatic increase in 
appeals over the last few decades. This situation promoted the appellate 
bench's growth, which increased the number and frequency of empty 
seats and frustrated efforts to fill them. The second is the present 
dilemma. Its principal sources are political and derive substantially from 
control of the White House and the Senate by opposing political parties 
since the late 1980s. I emphasize this concept, particularly the feature's 
political dimension, because those notions better explain the difficulties 
that have beset Sixth Circuit selection. However, the permanent 
complication warrants some consideration. This analysis should 
improve understanding, particularly of the historical developments 
which contributed to the current problem.3 
2 See, e.g., MILLER CENTER COMMISSION NUMBER 7, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 
SELECTION OF FEDERAL JUDGES (1996) [hereinafter MILLER REPORT); Gordon Berrnant et al., 
Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. COL. L. REV. 
319 (1994). I rely in this essay on Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided 
Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998). Many ideas in that article remain relevant. 
' It warrants less because much delay is inherent and, thus, defies treatment; political 
factors underlie less the persistent dilemma than the current problem; and it has been 
assessed elsewhere. See, e.g., Berrnant et al., supra note 2 (examining problem of judicial 
vacancies); The Committee on Federal Courts, Remedying the Permanent Vacancy Problem in 
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l. The Persistent Vacancies Problem 
The persistent dilemma comprises multiple constituents, certain of 
which can be traced to this country's origins and Article II of the United 
States Constitution. Nevertheless, I emphasize the dilemma's modern 
aspects, whose primary causes have been expanded federal court 
jurisdiction and mounting appeals. These phenomena have led 
Congress to authorize many new positions, thus increasing the number 
and frequency of vacancies as well as the difficulty of confirming judges. 
a. The Early History 
Article II's appointments clause provides that the President "shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint" judges.4 Founders envisioned that the Senate would serve as 
an effective check on the chief executive's potential for favoritism and 
would restrict the president's possible choice of unfit individuals while 
affording considerable stability.5 The Framers explicitly recognized, and 
consciously anticipated, that politics would be instrumental to judicial 
appointments. 
Senators have actively participated in selection since the nation was 
founded, and they have a substantial stake in affecting, or appearing to 
influence, the process.6 Complicated political accommodations between 
the chamber and the chief executive during the system's early phases 
have facilitated its operation.7 Moreover, senators have conventionally 
helped identify nominees, especially for the federal district courts. 
the Federal Judiciary -The Problem of Judicial Vacancies and Its Causes, 42 REC. Ass'N B. CITY 
N.Y. 374 (1987) [hereinafter N.Y. City Bar) (proposing possible solutions to problem of 
judicial vacancies); Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal Judicial Gridlock, 76 JUDICATURE 185 
(1993) (discussing solutions to federal judicial gridlock). 
4 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution accords the President and the 
Senate much greater responsibility than the House and the judiciary. The President 
includes Executive Branch officials, such as lawyers in the White House Counsel Office and 
the Department of Justice, who help the President. The Senate includes the Judiciary 
Committee, which has primary responsibility for the confirmation process, and its chair, 
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT); the Majority Leader, Senator William Frist (R-TN); and 
individual Senate members. 
' See The Federalist No. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) O. E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also 
MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 28 (2000); SHELDON GOLDMAN, 
PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 
(1997); Albert P. Melone, The Senate's Confirmation Role in Supreme Court Nominations and the 
Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality, 75 JUDICATURE 68, 69 (1991). 
6 See HAROLD w. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES, THE APPOINTING PROCESS 7 (1972). 
' See Bermant et al., supra note 2, at 321; see also GERHARDT, supra note 5, at 29-34; 
Melone, supra note 5. 
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Senators, or senior elected officials of the president's political party, from 
the state in which the judge will be stationed have normally 
recommended candidates whom the chief executive has subsequently 
nominated.8 
Politics, therefore, pervade appointments. If the president and 
senators disagree, they may act strategically to gain benefit and to 
control nomination and confirmation, even employing delay for tactical 
purposes.9 Examples of these ideas include Senator Abraham's 
successful efforts in blocking Senate consideration of Clinton nominees 
from Michigan and attempts by Senators Levin and Stabenow to prevent 
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings for Bush's Michigan designees.10 
Tension between the chief executive and chamber members will persist, 
as long as Senate advice and consent is required for confirmation.11 
In short, the president and senators have always shared responsibility 
for selecting judges in a process that has been politicized since the 
republic was created. However, significant numbers of openings, which 
could remain vacant for an extended time, only became a potential 
complication during the 1970s. Indeed, for almost 200 years after 
Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, the complement of appeals 
and district court judgeships slowly increased to 300. The few empty 
seats and their comparative infrequency meant that open positions were 
easily filled, thus preventing the dilemma which ultimately arose.12 
b. History Since 1950 
Federal court jurisdiction greatly expanded over the second half of the 
twentieth century.13 Congress federalized much criminal activity and 
prescribed many new civil causes of actions, which prompted a 300 
' President Dwight Eisenhower named few judges home-state senators opposed. 
Lawrence E. Walsh, The Federal Judiciary - Progress and the Road Ahead, 43 J. AM. 
JUDICATURE SOC'Y 155, 156 (1960); see also MILLER REPORT, supra note 2, at 4 (stating Robert 
Kennedy's view as Senate appointment with president's advice and consent). 
' See CHASE, supra note 6, at 14, 40; Bermant et al., supra note 2, at 321; see also Melone, 
supra note 5. 
10 See supra notes 1,5, infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. 
11 There are apparently two means for addressing that constitutional command. "One 
requires constitutional interpretation, the other constitutional amendment." Bermant et al, 
supra note 2, at 322. 
12 See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 2, at 531; MILLER REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. 
13 See MILLER REPORT, supra note 2, at 3; see also Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a 
National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1270 (1996) (noting 
congressional passage of statutes that expanded federal jurisdiction). See generally Martha 
Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1996 
WIS. L. REV. 12. 
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percent annual increase in district court filings since the 1960s.14 
Lawmakers responded to caseload growth by enlarging the number of 
federal judges; therefore, Congress has now authorized 844 active 
appellate and district court positions.15 
The Committee on Long Range Planning of the United States Judicial 
Conference, in a comprehensive 1995 assessment of the federal courts' 
future, predicted that docket increases would necessitate 2,300 active 
judges by 2010 and 4,170 by 2020.16 Although expanding the judiciary 
remains controversial,17 the bench will continue to grow, in part because 
Congress will apparently not limit civil or criminal jurisdiction.18 The 
Committee also ascertained that the period required to fill openings had 
lengthened.19 From 1980 until 1995, nominations on average consumed a 
year and confirmations three months, and the time for each component 
increased.20 A Federal Judicial Center (FJC) study determined that 
vacancy rates between 1970 and 1992 almost doubled in the federal 
districts and were more than twice as high in the appeals courts, while 
most delay occurred from the time of an opening until nomination.21 
The persistent dilemma has imposed numerous disadvantages. For 
example, vacancies have impeded the judiciary's efforts to decide cases 
promptly, while they have placed unwarranted pressure on sitting 
judges and posed difficulties for parties and attorneys who must 
14 See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223 (1995)); Americans With Disabilities 
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)). 
See generally William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overoiew, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719 
(1995) (discussing problems with expansion of federal power); MILLER REPORT, supra note 
2, at 3 (reporting problem of judicial vacancies). 
15 See 28 u.s.c. §§ 44, 133 (1994); see also VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2002), 
available at http:IIwww.uscourts.gov I vacancies I judgevacancy.htm. 
16 See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 16 (1995) (hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. The Long Range Planning 
Committee predicted that 1,330 judgeships would be required by 2000; however, Congress 
did not authorize those positions partly for political reasons. 
" Compare Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few fudges, Too 
Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52 with Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More fudges, Less Justice, 
A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70. 
18 See MILLER REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. See generally William L. Reynolds & William 
M. Richman, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand 
Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273 (1996) (discussing changes in appellate courts to 
accommodate growth in dockets). 
19 See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 16, at 103. 
1J) See id. at 3-4. 
21 See Bermant et al., supra note 2, at 323. 
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compete for scarce court resources.22 Moreover, in the 22 years after 
1970, empty seats had a statistically significant impact on average 
judicial workloads for appeals and district judges of nine and ten percent 
respectively.23 
This exploration demonstrated that politics have long attended judicial 
selection.24 However, some observers of the process assert that 
politicization has increased since the 1960s, beginning in the 
administration of President Richard Nixon, who pledged to reestablish 
"law and order" by· naming conservative jurists and "strict 
constructionists."25 A more contemporary strain originated with the 
Senate rejection of Circuit Judge Robert Bork, whom President Ronald 
Reagan had nominated for the Supreme Court in 1987. 
2. The Current Impasse 
Political factors appear more relevant to the present dilemma than the 
persistent one, but politics permeate each, thus obscuring their exact 
relationship. These notions indicate that political phenomena underlie 
the current problem, and both seem responsible for recent Sixth Circuit 
appointments. The existing difficulty, therefore, warrants some 
treatment, even though closeness in time frustrates comprehension of 
precisely what transpired. 
a. General Overview of the Current Impasse 
Over the last decade and a half, distrust, partisan wrangling, 
divisiveness and paybacks have often characterized the judicial selection 
process. For virtually this entire period, judicial selection proceeded in a 
milieu of divided government, with one party controlling the White 
House, which has nomination and appointment powers, and the other 
party having a Senate majority, which must give its advice and consent 
for confirmation. 
Several reasons explain why greater controversy has accompanied 
judicial selection for the regional circuits. First, there have been few 
Supreme Court vacancies in the last decade and those that arose have 
22 See N.Y. City Bar, supra note 3, at 374. 
23 See Bermant et al., supra note 2, at 327. 
" See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text. 
25 See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULEITE 20 (1988) (discussing judgeships as 
symbol of presidential power); Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senate 
Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 274, 274 (1997) (commenting on 
increased attention and scrutiny of appointment of lower federal court judges). 
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not been sharply contested. After the tumultuous appointment of Justice 
Clarence Thomas,26 chief executives have nominated, and the Senate has 
approved, individuals who appeared to possess moderate political 
views. Second, district court openings have traditionally been, and 
essentially remain, the prerogative of senators who represent the areas in 
which vacancies occur. Notions of senatorial courtesy and respect and 
the idea that trial court seats constitute perhaps the last remaining 
vestige of unalloyed political patronage mean they are rarely 
controversial. Third, the regional circuits are increasingly perceived as 
the courts of last resort which resolve critical public policy issues, such as 
religious freedom and federalism, partly because the Supreme Court 
hears so few appeals.27 
These ideas do not suggest that the process has inexorably spiraled 
downward for a decade and a half; there have been periods when 
appeals court selection functioned rather smoothly. For example, 
President George H.W. Bush and Republican and Democratic senators 
seemingly attempted to cooperate after the confirmation battle over 
Justice Thomas. This development fostered Justice David Souter's 
relatively non-controversial appointment and comparatively effective 
lower court selection in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, at the conclusion 
of the Bush presidency, 100 appeals and district court positions remained 
open. Democratic senators claimed the vacancies resulted from the chief 
executive's failure to nominate steadily qualified persons whom 
Democrats deemed acceptable.28 Republicans ascribed the unfilled seats 
26 See, e.g., JANE MA YER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF 
CLARENCE THOMAS (1994) (discussing appointment of Clarence Thomas to United States 
Supreme Court); TlMOTifY PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES (1997) 
(discussing appointment of Clarence Thomas to United States Supreme Court). 
27 See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Move to Limit Clinton's Judicial Choices Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
30, 1997, at Dl (discussing Senate rejection of proposal to give individual senators greater 
role in appointment of federal appellate judges); Obstruction of Justice, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 
May 19, l997, at 9 (reporting Republican conference's vote to "respond legislatively to 
judicial activism"); Jeffrey Rosen, Obstruction of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, § 6, p. 38 
(discussing obstructions in process of appointing judges); see also RICHARD POSNER, THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 80-81, 194-95 (1996) (proposing remedies to problem of federal courts' 
increased caseload); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 
SUP. CT. REV. 403 (1997) (commenting on reasons why Supreme Court's docket has 
decreased despite increased volume of cases brought to Court for review). 
28 See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. 52538 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) 
(commenting on lack of nominations for federal court judges); Sheldon Goldman, Bush's 
Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282, 284 (1993) (discussing whether Bush 
administration invested sufficient resources in judicial selection). See generally Carl Tobias, 
More Women Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L. REV. 477 (1991) (assessing why President 
George Bush increased percentage of women appointed for federal judgeships during third 
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to the Senate majority's slowed consideration of Bush nominees because 
senators controlling the chamber anticipated that a Democratic candidate 
might capture the White House.29 
During the Clinton Administration, there were similarly certain 
unusual times in which judicial appointments to the appellate courts 
proceeded relatively well. For example, close cooperation between 
Clinton and Democrats who held a Senate majority prompted 
confirmation of more than 100 judges during 1994.30 Sixty nominees 
correspondingly secured approval four years later when Republican 
senators had recaptured the body.31 
From January 1995, when the GOP assumed Senate control, thus 
reinstituting a divided government, until the Clinton Administration's 
conclusion, the dynamics of partisanship, divisiveness, and payback 
generally dominated selection. Thus, upon President Clinton's 
departure from the White House, there were almost 30 openings on the 
regional circuits - practically the same number as the time of his 
inauguration. 32 The 2000 elections left Republicans with a one-vote 
Senate majority and enabled President George W. Bush to lead a 
government that was not divided. However, this opportunity proved 
short-lived when Senator James Jeffords (R-VT) became an independent 
in May 2001,33 a development which profoundly affected appointments 
by according the Democrats Senate control. 
year of his term and its consequences). 
29 See Goldman, supra note 28. See generally Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial 
Selection, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1270-74 (discussing differences between Bush 
administration's and Reagan administration's approach to federal judicial appointments). 
30 See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection Under Clinton: A Midterm Examination, 78 
JUDICATURE 276, 279 (1995); Carl Tobias, Increasing Balance on the Federal Bench, 32 Haus. L. 
REV. 137, 154 (1995). 
'
1 See Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's Second Term Judiciary: Picking 
Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDICATURE 265, 267 (1999); Carl Tobias, Choosing fudges at the Close of 
the Clinton Administration, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 827, 841-44 (2000); Carl Tobias, Leaving a 
Legacy on the Federal Courts, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 315, 325-27 (1999). For reasons why this 
occurred, see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
32 See v ACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2000), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/12042000/judgevacancy.htm; see also Carl Tobias, 
Dear President Bush, 67 Mo. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002) (suggesting how President Bush might 
discharge duty to appoint federal judges); Nick Anderson, Democrats Look to Battles After 
Ashcroft, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at A14 (commenting on vast number of federal judicial 
positions Bush must fill in term as President). 
" See Neil A. Lewis, Washington Talk: Road to Federal Bench Gets Bumpier in Senate, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 26, 2001, at Al6 [hereinafter Lewis, Washington Talk); David Rogers, Sen. Jeffords 
Defects From GOP, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2001, at Al6; Editorial, True Bipartisanship, WALL ST. 
J., May 31, 2001, at A16. 
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b. Specific Analysis of the Current Impasse 
This subsection attempts to recount the current problem accurately by 
consulting the behavior and observations of many participants in judicial 
selection. I scrutinize the second Clinton Administration and George W. 
Bush's Administration to date, stressing the initial year of each, because 
appointments during 1997 and 2001 were relatively similar and recent. 
This emphasis is appropriate, even though the present complication 
appeared to originate earlier, perhaps with Judge Bork's 1987 rejection. 
Numerous political factors which accompanied selection throughout 
the fifteen years contributed significantly to the current situation, 
although certain features of the generic dilemma have implicated 
appointments since 1997, particularly in that year and 2001. Each chief 
executive and the Senate- including the Majority Leader, the Judiciary 
Committee, its chair and panel members, and specific senators - were 
principally responsible for many phenomena that comprise the existing 
difficulty. These public officials alone or in combination could have 
remedied or ameliorated numerous problems if they exercised the 
requisite political will. 
The time that the Clinton and Bush Administrations and the respective 
Senates required to conclude nomination and confirmation were 
substantial and analogous during 1997 and 2001. For example, in 1997, 
nominations on average consumed over 600 days, with confirmations 
needing a record high of 183 days.34 Much delay which involved 
appointments continued to happen between the date an opening arose 
and the president submitted a nominee. 
(1) Nomination Process 
The dearth of confirmations during 1997 and 2001 resulted in part 
from slow nominee submission. Some temporal complications should be 
ascribed to both chief executives and to individual senators or other 
political officers who recommended designees for presidential 
consideration. However, in 1997, additional participants, namely 
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), then chair of the Judiciary Committee; 
Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), then Senate Majority Leader; and other GOP 
senators delayed processing out of concerns regarding matters such as 
34 See Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 37; see also Orrin G. 
Hatch, There's No Vacancy Crisis in the Federal Courts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at A15 
(claiming confirmation required 91 days and nominations required 618 days); Editorial, 
Clearing the Bench, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 17, 1997, at A16 (reciting similar statistics); 
supra note 20 and accompanying text (affording comparable data for 1980-1995). 
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"judicial activism." During 2001, their analogues, Senators Patrick Leahy 
(D-VT) and Tom Daschle (D-SD), might have similarly slowed 
consideration because Democrats found the political perspectives of 
some Bush nominees troubling. 
The presidents apparently had certain responsibility for the small 
number of appointments attributable to delays in tendering nominees. 
For instance, on January 7, 1997, the Clinton Administration forwarded 
22 attorneys for nomination, many of whom had been nominated in the 
previous Congress and had testified in confirmation hearings or had 
secured favorable committee votes. President Bush did not announce his 
initial set of nominees until May 2001.35 Both chief executives thereafter 
gradually, albeit rather sporadically, provided additional names. 
Illustrative was each president's tendency to suggest large groups as the 
Senate neared a recess.36 Most designees of the two chief executives were 
apparently well qualified, and a number had served on the federal or 
state bench. 37 Some seemed to possess moderate political views, several 
were affiliated with the party that did not control the presidency, and 
previous presidents had named a few as district judges.38 
In fairness, the chief executives' tendency to submit many persons 
immediately before Senate recesses and their general treatment of the 
nomination process posed certain difficulties. Tendering numerous 
people at once on the eve of a Senate recess frustrated Judiciary 
Committee consideration. Clinton had forwarded only eight new 
designees by June 1997. Senator Hatch found some unacceptable in the 
January group, thereby enabling him to claim that the Committee lacked 
sufficient nominees for effective Committee processing.39 
35 See The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Twenty-
two to the Federal Bench (Jan. 7, 1997); REMARKS ANNOUNCING NOMINATIONS FOR THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 37 PuB. PAPERS 19 (May 14, 2001) (hereinafter PRESIDENT'S REMARKS). 
36 The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Thirteen to the 
Federal Bench (July 31, 1997); Jonathan Ringel, Bush Nominates 18 to Federal Bench, AM. LAW. 
MEDIA, Aug. 6, 2001 [hereinafter Ringel, Bush Nominates 18]. 
37 PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, supra note 35; see Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Courts in an 
Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309, 315 (1996); Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's 
First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 254, 258-59 (1997). See generally 
143 CONG. REC. S5653 (daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy); infra notes 70, 114-
116 and accompanying text. 
38 See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 37; Shannon P. Duffy, Clinton Announces 
Nominees for Eastern District Court, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 4, 1997, at l; David G. 
Savage, Bush Picks 11 for Federal Bench, L.A. DMES, May 10, 2001, at Al; see also infra notes 
68-70, 114-16, and accompanying text. 
39 See Hatch, supra note 34; see also Neil A. Lewis, Keeping Track; Vacant Federal 
Judgeships, N.Y. DMES, Aug. 11, 1997, at Al2. Analogous are President Bush's submission 
of rather few additional nominees by June 2001 and Senator Leahy's apparently 
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Neither administration proffered designees for every opening, which 
would have permitted it to pressure the Judiciary panel and the Senate, 
although there was little reason to provide more individuals than Hatch 
and Leahy had suggested they would consider.40 In 1997 and 2001, both 
presidents had nominated more persons than the respective Committee 
chairs had indicated the panel would review. Clinton and Bush also had 
to balance expediency and careful examination of nominees' capabilities 
and character, because designees who proved controversial or lacked 
competence or were unethical might have eroded administration 
credibility and could have slowed or jeopardized the process. 
Particular senators or other political figures from the areas where 
vacancies arose who proposed individuals to the chief executives may 
have delayed nominations during 1997 and 2001. For example, in 
jurisdictions without Senate members from the president's party, 
designating the officials who were to suggest attorneys or treatirig 
demands that senators participate consumed resources. During the 
Clinton Administration, GOP senators from Arizona and Washington 
insisted that they be involved and even recommend lawyers.41 When 
President Bush was preparing his initial appeals court slate, lack of 
consultation with the Maryland Democratic senators may have jettisoned 
one designee's nomination,42 and similar circumstances in California 
seemingly led another candidate to withdraw.43 . 
The Clinton and Bush Administrations are largely responsible for the 
slow transmittal of nominees.44 Insofar as both administrations could 
considering unacceptable some nominees included in the May package. 
40 During 1997, Senator Hatch typically conducted one hearing each month that the 
105th Senate was in session for one appellate, and four or five district court, nominees. See 
infra note 48 and accompanying text. Senator Leahy followed a somewhat similar 
approach during much of 2001. Ringel, Bush Nominates 18, supra note 36. 
•
1 See Peter Callaghan, Senators Agree on Selecting Judges, NEWS TRIBUNE, Aug. 12, 1997, 
at Bl; Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, § 1, at 
30 [hereinafter Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts]; see also 143 CONG. REC. 
S2538-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (saying GOP senators may have 
so intimated). 
" See David L. Greene & Thomas Healy, Bush Sends Judge List to Senate, BALT. SUN, 
May 10, 2001, at lA; Lewis, Washington Talk, supra note 33; see also infra note 118 and 
accompanying text. 
" See Jean 0. Paso et al., Cox Gives up Shot at Judgeship, L.A. TIMES, l\1ay 26, 2001, at Al; 
Henry Weinstein, Rep. Cox Called Likely Judicial Nominee, L.A. nMES, Apr. 5, 2001, at Al; see 
also Savage, supra note 38. 
" See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Confirmation Process Frustrates President; Clinton Wants Senate 
GOP to Pick Up Pace, WASH. POST, July 25, 1997, at A21; Greg Pierce, Clinton vs. Clinton, 
WASH. nMES, Aug. 12, 1997, at A6; President's Counsel Quits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at 
B22; Savage, supra note 38. 
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have encouraged senators and other political officers to speed their 
recommendations for the presidents, Executive Branch staff might have 
done more or been frustrated by the "start-up" costs of creating an 
administration. illustrative was the time each president spent 
assembling a Justice Department. 
In short, Clinton and Bush discharged their nomination duties rather 
similarly in 1997 and 2001. To be sure, the administrations did not rely 
on identical practices, but the differences were merely of degree. Both 
chief executives could also have anticipated or remedied some problems 
experienced by deriving lessons from previous selection endeavors, 
although certain difficulties might be inherent in the process. 
(2) ABA Committee 
Throughout the 104th Congress, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, which has rated candidates' 
qualifications since the mid-twentieth century, continued to provide that 
valuable service.45 Nevertheless, Senator Hatch expressed mounting 
concern about ABA participation and, in February 1997, he terminated 
formal Bar Association involvement with the Senate, although President 
Clinton relied upon the entity's rankings for his entire second term.46 In 
March 2001, the Bush Administration correspondingly informed the 
ABA that President Bush would not seek its input before tendering 
nominations.47 
(3) Confirmation Process 
During 1997 and 2001, the Senate Judiciary Committee bore partial 
responsibility for slowed appointments principally by failing to 
investigate, hold hearings for, and vote on additional nominees. For 
" For the proposition included in the text as well as the notions that the ABA is overly 
political and too slow, see MILLER REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-6, 8, 11. See generally 
AMERICAN BAR AsSCX:IATION, STANDING COMMITIEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY-WHAT IS IT 
AND How IT WORKS (1983) available at 
http: I I www .abanet.org/ scfedjud /backgrounder.html. 
46 See, e.g., Terry Carter, A Conservative Juggernaut, A.B.A. J., June 1997, at 32; N. Lee 
Cooper, Standing Up to Critical Scrutiny, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 6. 
" See Letter from Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, to Martha Barnett, ABA 
President (Mar. 22, 2001); see also Laura Little, The ABA's Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial 
Candidates, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 37, 37 (2001). Democrats' insistence on ABA input 
led to more delay, but the future influence that the ABA will have is unclear. See Senate 
Judiciary Comm.: Hearings on Judicial Nominations, 107th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2002) 
(statement of Sen. Leahy). See generally Jonathan Groner, ABA Adjusts to Role on Judges, 
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 5, 2002, at 10. 
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instance, the panel normally held a hearing in which one appellate court 
nominee and four or five district court designees testified each month of 
the 105th Congress's initial session and during much of the Second 
Clinton Administration. However, the committee did not invariably 
adhere to the schedule; and the Senate had confirmed only nine judges 
by early September 1997.48 President Bush and other observers similarly 
criticized the Senate for failing to hold enough hearings, particularly for 
appeals court nominees, and for approving a mere 28 judges during 
2001, although the Committee apparently operated better and had 
conducted hearings for all district court designees by spring 2002.49 
The few 1997 appointments might be ascribed to inadequate 
Committee resources and to politics. For example, Senator Hatch 
resolved the ongoing controversy about the ABA. Republican Senate 
members discussed the confirmation responsibilities of the panel, its 
chair and specific senators, but ultimately maintained the status quo.so 
These disputes consumed resources that could have been devoted to 
approving judges. The comparatively few confirmations in 2001 might 
similarly have resulted from the panel's commitment of deficient 
resources to the process and from politics.s1 Senator Leahy did invoke 
special measures to expedite review, namely exceptional hearings during 
the August recess.s2 Insofar as particular Democratic members delayed 
nominees, they could have been "paying back" the GOP for its slowed 
48 See Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal fudges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741 (1997). Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), who served as Committee 
chair from 1987 until 1994, claimed that there were two hearings each month in his tenure. 
See 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2539 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997). 
" See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Bush and Democrats in Senate Trade Blame for fudge Shortage, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2002, at A9; Editorial, Judicial Nominations Scorecard, WASH. POST, Aug. 
9, 2002, at A22. Most controversial were the rejection of Judges Priscilla Owen and Charles 
Pickering on 10-9 party-line votes after contentious hearings and debate. See Albert R. 
Hunt, The Politics of Lifetime Appointments, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2002, at Al9; Neil A. Lewis, 
Democrats Reject Bush Pick in Battle Over Court Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2002, at Al; Neil 
A. Lewis, First Punch in the Revived Bench-Tipping Brawl, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2002, at§ 1, p. 
35. 
50 See sources cited supra note 26; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
51 I rely here on the Symposium On The Judicial Appointments Process, 10 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1, 1-176 (2001); Senate Judiciary Comm.: Hearings on Judicial Nominations, 
supra note 47 (Feb. 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy), (Mar. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch); Jonathan Ringel, Picking fudges: The Art of the Deal, THE RECORDER, Apr. 30, 2001, at 
l; Ringel, Bush Nominates, supra note 36; William Safire, Battle of the Blue Slips, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 10, 2001, at A33. 
52 See Senate Judiciary Comm.: Hearings on Potential Judicial Nominations (Aug. 22. 
& Aug. 27, 2001); see also Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Are Pushed on judicial Nominees, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at§ lA, p. 22. 
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treatment of Clinton designees.s3 Moreover, the May determination of 
Senator James Jeffords (R-VT) to assume independent status meant that 
the Senate did not conclude an organizational agreement until July, 
which postponed the process' institution and felicitous operation.54 
In fairness, public officials who have life tenure and exercise the great 
power of the United States warrant deliberate consideration to insure 
that they are qualified, while appropriately balancing nominee scrutiny 
and prompt processing is subtle and complex. Senator Hatch claimed he 
preferred to discharge this obligation with substantial care, but politics 
apparently contributed as much as caution to delayed confirmation.ss 
Senator Lott and the Republican leadership seemed to be more 
responsible for slowed consideration during 1997. The Senate had 
approved only nine judges by September of that year, although the 
Judiciary Committee had voted favorably on numerous others and sent 
their names to the floor.s6 Some observers believe Senator Daschle and 
Democratic leaders behaved similarly in 2001.s7 The pressures imposed 
by other critical business as well as the chamber's unanimous consent 
procedure may explain certain delays in placing nominees with panel 
approval on the Senate calendar and according them floor debates and 
votes. 
53 See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Aid Bill is Stalled By Bid to Force Votes on Judges, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
17, 2001, at Al6; Paul A. Gigot, How Feinstein is Repaying Bush on Judges, WALL ST. J., May 9, 
2001, at A26; Hunt, supra note 49; Neil A. Lewis, Party Leaders Clash in Capitol Over Pace of 
Filling Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A33. 
54 See supra note 33. The presidents were also responsible because, in early 1997 and 
2001, each tendered few names, some of whom the chair or his colleagues opposed, and 
sent others irregularly, thus slowing the process. However, Hatch's claim that he lacked 
nominees to process seemed unconvincing, as delay also resulted from the few hearings 
for, and votes on, nominees and senators' opposition. Similarly, by the conclusion of 2001, 
Bush had furnished enough names, but that may have been too late. See supra notes 36, 39-
40 and accompanying text. 
55 Hatch faced conflicts in Senate traditions and obligations to GOP senators who 
opposed activist judges. He did criticize opposition to some nominees and resist the 
challenge to Senate traditions, and the 1997 record resembled some in prior similar periods. 
See 143 CONG. REC. S2538-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997); see also Ted Gest et al., The GOP's 
Judicial Freeze -A Fight to See Who Rules Over the Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 26, 
1997, at 23; Neil A. Lewis, Republicans Seek Greater Influence in Naming Judges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 26, 1997, at 1; Novak, supra note 34. But see supra text accompanying note 49. 
56 This dynamic was similar to Republican consideration of nominees during the 1996 
election year. See Hatch, supra note 34; 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8045 (daily ed. July 24, 
1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 37, at 257 
(recounting 1996 treatment); Tobias, supra note 48 (same). 
57 See David Savage, Bush's Nominees Go 28 for 80 in Senate, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at 
A12. 
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However, the small number of judges confirmed in 1997, particularly 
as contrasted with earlier periods, suggests that considerable 
responsibility could be assigned the Senate majority leadership and its 
inability to schedule floor votes. At the 105th Congress' outset, Lott 
pledged to evaluate assiduously Clinton nominees.58 That spring, 
Senator Leahy, who was then the Judiciary Committee ranking minority 
member, and additional Democrats responded by explaining how they 
had facilitated selection in GOP presidencies by calling for floor debate 
and votes on nominees.59 
(4) Nomination and Confirmation 
In 1997 and 2001, some Executive Branch and Senate employees who 
worked on appointments may not have appreciated the problem's 
gravity, as manifested in the uneven pace of nominations and of 
Committee consideration. Numerous observers, including senators, 
asserted that the present difficulty and much delay were animated 
primarily by politics and even by concerns related to nominees' political 
views. For example, in 1997, Senators Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Paul 
Sarbanes (D-MD) claimed that their Republican colleagues were 
politicizing selection and modifying 200 years of tradition.60 
A project some observers considered political and which implicated 
the current dilemma and slow processing was the effort of Senator 
Charles Grassley (R-IA) to assess how regional circuits use and distribute 
judicial resources.61 For instance, his subcommittee held hearings to 
ascertain if the appeals courts needed additional positions or even their 
existing complements.62 Perhaps most significant to the issues treated in 
58 See Lewis, Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts, supra note 41. See generally Gest et 
al., supra note 55; Novak, supra note 34. 
59 Senators Biden and Sarbanes urged that all nominees have floor votes. See 143 
CONG. REC. 52538-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997). When Lott threatened delay, Leahy 
recounted nominees, with bipartisan support and unanimous panel votes, to courts under 
pressure. Id. at 55653 (daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
60 Id. at S2538, S2541. Biden even said the GOP was attempting to prevent Clinton 
appeals court appointments. Id. at S2538. Others offered similar ideas. Professor Sheldon 
Goldman said "a newly-elected president has [never] faced this sort of challenge to his 
judicial nominations," while Professor Geoffrey Stone found the GOP actions irresponsible. 
See Gest et al., supra note 55 (quoting both professors). 
61 See Charles E. Grassley, Chairman's Report on the Appropriate Allocation of 
Judgeships in the United States Courts of Appeals (1999) [hereinafter Grassley's Report]; 
Tobias, supra note 48. 
•
2 See, e.g., Conserving Judicial Resources: Considering the Appropriate Allocation of 
Judgeships in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Before the Sen. Judiciary 
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts, 105th Cong. Oune 25, 1998); Conserving 
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this essay was Chief Judge Martin's written statement, in which he 
asserted the Sixth Circuit could operate better with several more 
members but was "functioning effectively and efficiently."63 It was 
working well in part through "practices designed to enhance [the 
tribunal's] efficiency and improve" justice's administration and "heavy 
reliance on visiting judges [that he warned] can lead to instability and 
unpredictability in the law of the circuit."64 Senator Grassley issued a 
report which found that few courts required new positions and that the 
Sixth Circuit should have no additional judgeships until the tribunal 
"takes alternative approaches to manage its caseload efficiently" by, for 
example, "channeling more work to staff counsel and by granting oral 
65 
argument only [when] truly necessary." 
The proper employment of appellate court resources is a legitimate 
Senate concern. However, this endeavor may have delayed 
appointments to regional circuits, which have experienced large 
percentages of openings, numerous judicial emergencies, and mounting 
dockets.66 Moreover, lawmakers have not created any appeals court 
judgeships for twelve years, even though the Judicial Conference has 
recommended that Congress authorize numerous positions, including 
two for the Sixth Circuit. The entities based this proposal on expert, 
conservative calculations and carefully assembled empirical information 
regarding dockets and workloads.67 
Judicial Resources: Considering the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Hearing Before the Sen. Judiciary Subcornrn. on Adrnin. 
Oversight & the Courts, 105th Cong. (Feb. 5, 1997). Chief Judge Martin regretted the "press 
of case related duties [did] not permit [him] to attend the hearing" on the Sixth and 
Seventh Circuits but submitted a "written statement for inclusion in the record." See Letter 
from Boyce F. Martin, Jr., Sixth Circuit Chief Judge, to Sen. Charles Grassley, Chair, Senate 
Judiciary Subcornrn. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts (June 19, 1998); see also Statement of 
Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., Before the Subcornrn. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts 
(June 25, 1998) [hereinafter Statement of Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr.]. 
63 See Statement of Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., supra note 62, at 1. The practices 
were staff screening of cases, alternatives to dispute resolution, opinions from the bench as 
well as telephonic oral arguments in some cases and waivers in others. Id. at 3. 
" Id. 
" See Grassley's REPORT, supra note 61; see also Analysis of the Sixth Circuit 1, 4 
(providing quoted material and view that some judges opposed more positions) 
[hereinafter Sixth Circuit Analysis]; Tobias, supra note 48, at 749-50 (finding that many 
judges on several of regional circuits opposed increasing courts' judicial complements). 
66 Twenty-five seats were open. See THE THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 1997, at 5; VACANCIES IN 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1997). For data on docket growth, see POSNER, supra note 27, at 58-
64; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 16, at 10. 
67 Tobias, supra note 48, at 753 (describing proposal as conservative); see also S.1145, 
106th Cong. (1997) (providing judgeships bill); 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2540 (daily ed. Mar. 
19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (claiming that Conference documented needs to fill 
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Rather similar developments attended selection in 2001. For example, 
three of the eleven appellate court nominees forwarded by Bush during 
May received confirmation that year.68 Senator Leahy and other 
Democrats, such as Senator Charles Schumer (0-NY), publicly 
announced that the Senate would accord prompt approval to designees 
they found capable and politically moderate.69 For instance, the Senate 
easily confirmed Judge Roger Gregory and Judge Barrington Parker, 
whom President Clinton had named earlier.70 
Many activities of senators whose party did not control the White 
House substantiated the assertions that the current problem and delay 
were politically motivated, in particular by concerns related to nominees' 
perceived ideological perspectives. Illustrative have been the numerous 
appellate openings that senators find more important than district 
courts, because the shrunken Supreme Court caseload and the 
applicability of regional circuits' decisions to multiple states mean they 
increasingly serve as courts of last resort for those locales.71 
(5) Prospects for Change 
Insofar as certain political phenomena that accompanied appointments 
in 1997 and 2001 and led to the present dilemma are intrinsic, they might 
resist amelioration. For example, the evaluation of persistent vacancies 
indicated that measures which increase efficiency and resources will 
only limit delay that is not attributable to politics. Nonetheless, the 
analysis of political factors which constitute . the existing problem 
suggested that public officers might remedy the situation, if they had 
sufficient political will. Indeed, politics are all that seemed to prevent 
Presidents Clinton and Bush from expeditiously submitting additional 
vacancies and to authorize more judges but GOP urged decommissioning of judgeships); 
Letter from Leonadis Ralph Mecham, Sec'y, to Sen. Patrick Leahy (May 28, 2002) (urging 
action on Conference proposals) (on file with author). 
68 See, e.g., Jonathan Groner, Placing Bets on Bush Bench, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 2002, at 1 
[hereinafter Groner, Placing Bets]; supra notes 35, 49 and accompanying text. But see infra 
notes 69-70, 114-16 and accompanying text. 
69 See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, More Battles Loom Over Bush's Nominees for Judgeships, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at§ 1, p. 24; sources cited supra note 47; see also infra notes 114-16 and 
accompanying text. 
70 See Mark Hamblett, Parker Brings Experience and Intellect to Court, N.Y.L. J., Oct. 25, 
2001, at l; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Appeals for Peace on His Picks for the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 
10, 2001, at A29; Unappealing Judges, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16, 2002, at A18. Clinton gave 
Gregory a recess appointment to the Fourth Circuit. See Allison Mitchell, Senators Confirm 3 
fudges, Including Once-Stalled Black, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A28. 
71 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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candidates with moderate political views and a majority of senators from 
promptly confirming them. 
(6) Effects of the Current Impasse 
The current difficulty has created many problems, some of which 
resemble ones the permanent dilemma fosters. 72 For instance, the 
present dilemma has imposed analogous pressures on tribunals and 
litigants, impacts witnessed in factors, such as judicial workloads. The 
district courts have substantial civil backlogs, so that individuals and 
entities must wait years to conclude their cases.73 Moreover, docket 
increases and vacancies during 1997 compelled Ninth Circuit 
cancellation of 600 oral arguments, while similar circumstances required 
the Sixth Circuit to postpone 60 arguments.74 In July, the impending 
crisis, fueled by numerous empty seats and difficulties, led seven 
national legal organizations to write an open letter requesting that the 
chief executive and the Senate Majority Leader devote the requisite 
resources to facilitate selection.75 At the end of 1997 and 2001, Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist, in nearly identical terms, similarly urged both 
the White House and Senate to expedite confirmation.76 The concepts 
above demonstrate how vacant judgeships can disadvantage millions of 
people. To the extent that the public finds the existing impasse results 
from partisan politics, the actions may erode respect for the government, 
especially presidents and senators. 
n See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
73 See Gest et al., supra note 55; see also Robert Schmidt, The Costs of Judicial Delay, LEGAL 
TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997, at 6 (assessing substantial civil backlogs and additional costs imposed 
by delayed selection). 
" Novak, supra note 34; Chronic Federal Judge Shortage Puts Lives, Justice On Hold, LAS 
VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 13, 1997, at A9 (providing information on 6th Circuit); Bill Kisliuk, 
Judges' Conference Slams Circuit-Splitting, Vacancies, THE RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1 
(providing information on 9th Circuit). 
75 See Letter to William J. Clinton, President, from N. Lee Cooper, ABA President, et 
al., July 14, 1997, reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. 58046 (daily ed. July 24, 1997); see also sources 
cited supra note 46. 
" See William H. Rehnquist, 2001 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, available at 
http: I I www .supremecourtus.gov I publicinfo I year-end /2001 year-endreport.htrnl; 
William H. Rehnquist, 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 30 THE THIRD BRANCH, 
NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 1 (1998) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb 
/jan98ttb/january.htrn. Similar ideas appear in Judicial Nominations Scorecard, supra note 49 
and a resolution adopted at the ABA's recent annual meeting. See Jonathan Groner, ABA: 
Speed Up Judicial Nomination Process, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 14, 2002, at 4. 
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C. Sixth Circuit Developments 
The rise and development of the factors which have made Sixth 
Circuit appointments controversial in some ways resemble and in some 
ways diverge from the national phenomena discussed above. This 
court's problems also are comparatively recent and rather complicated. 
For example, the dispute over the Michigan vacancies appears 
principally to implicate political infighting among the state's past and 
current United States senators. However, the controversy about the 
Ohio positions seems to have national overtones and to be animated 
partly by interest group concerns regarding the nominees' political 
• 77 
views. 
Several considerations alone and in combination have meant that the 
persistent difficulty had little applicability to the Sixth Circuit until the 
last quarter century. These factors encompassed the court's rather small 
docket and judicial complement and the relative infrequency with which 
its seats opened. For instance, as recently as 1975, the Sixth Circuit, like 
most appellate courts, terminated less than 1,000 appeals (tiny 
percentages of which were complex); accorded most filings appellate 
justice; operated with few active judges (9); and encountered rare 
vacancies that chief executives and senators easily filled. 
In the late 1970s, the Sixth Circuit sustained multiplying caseloads and 
its membership grew to eleven when Congress enacted omnibus 
judgeships legislation.78 Even burgeoning dockets and the concomitant 
increase in the tribunal's complement apparently had limited effects on 
appointments during the 1980s. Lawmakers approved four new 
positions, while President Ronald Reagan promptly nominated, and the 
Senate expeditiously confirmed, judges for the numerous openings 
which arose. The court had no empty seats at his administration's end. 
The longstanding ·vacancies problem, thus, lacked much historical 
import for the Sixth Circuit, although it may explain selection over the 
last several years. 
In contrast, the present dilemma seems ~uite salient. A 1990 statute 
expanded the tribunal to sixteen members. 9 Some positions opened in 
77 See, e.g., Michael Collins, Approval of Judges is Stalled, CINCINNATI POST, Nov. 17, 
2001, at lA; Groner, Placing Bets, supra note 68; Lewis, supra note 33. See generally GERHARD, 
supra note 5, at 213-19; sources cited supra notes 49, 68. 
" See Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629-32 (1978); see also 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1994). See 
generally WILLIAM MCLAUGHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS (1984). I rely here on 
GOLDMAN, supra note 5, at 285-345. 
79 See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5099 (1990); see also 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1994); Goldman, 
supra note 28; Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 
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the presidency of George H.W. Bush, who experienced problems filling 
them, especially near his administration's end. Democratic senators 
holding a majority ascribed the complications to tardy, erratic 
nomination of people they deemed acceptable, while GOP chamber 
members alleged Democrats slowed consideration of capable designees 
because they hoped the Democratic candidate would win the 
presidential election.80 In any event, when Bush departed the White 
House, the Sixth Circuit had some vacancies.81 
Judicial selection followed a somewhat analogous pattern over the 
course of the Clinton presidency. For example, the administration 
realized considerable success, particularly during the initial five years of 
its tenure. The chief executive rather felicitously appointed to the 
appellate court numerous well qualified judges, including Eric Clay, R. 
Guy Cole, Jr., Martha Craig Daughtrey, Ronald Gilman, and Karen 
Nelson Moore.82 
Clinton did encounter difficulty securing confirmation of his nominees 
in his second term. Indeed, throughout most of 2000, the Sixth Circuit 
operated with four empty seats for which the administration had 
proposed three nominees, only one of whom it had suggested early that 
year. In 1997, the chief executive tendered Helene White, a Michigan 
Court of Appeals judge, and in 1999 forwarded Kathleen McCree Lewis, 
an experienced Detroit litigator, but Senator Abraham precluded 
Judiciary Committee hearings on both nominees.83 In February 2000, 
Clinton nominated Kent Markus, who had discharged several high-level 
policy assignments in the Justice Department, for an Ohio seat, and he 
received Senate treatment similar to that of White and Lewis.84 
Notwithstanding the administration's endeavors, when Clinton finished 
his second term, the 16-member tribunal had four vacancies. In 2001, an 
identical number (4) of active judges correspondingly assumed senior 
74 JUDICATURE 294 (1991). See generally Tobias, supra note 29, at 1270-74. 
"' See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
81 See VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1992). See generally sources cited supra 
note 78. 
82 For example, Judges Daughtrey and Gilman had rendered distinguished service as 
Tennessee state court judges, while Judge Cole was a bankruptcy judge. See FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL ALMANAC (2002). 
83 See, e.g., Nedra Pickler, Bush Picks Judge for Appeals Panel, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, June 
27, 2002, at AlS; Jonathan Ringel, The Battle for the 6th Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, 
at 8. 
84 See The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates Robert f. 
Cindrich, Kent R. Markus, John Antoon, II and Phyllis J. Hamilton to the Federal Bench (Feb. 9, 
2000); see also v ACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2001 ), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/judgevacancy.htrn; Ringel, supra note 83. 
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status.85 
The numerous Sixth Circuit openings and the significant time that 
they have lacked occupants may have detrimentally affected its efforts to 
dispense appellate justice. For example, the Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals - which recently 
undertook an evaluation of the appellate system at Congress's request-
determined that the Sixth Circuit publishes fewer opinions than most 
other appellate courts.86 The tribunal only publishes opinions in 18 
percent of the cases it reviews, which is five points below the national 
average and one-half the rate provided by four courts.87 Moreover, the 
Commission found that the Sixth Circuit concludes filings less 
expeditiously from notice of appeal to final resolution than all tribunals 
save the one which has the biggest caseload. The court also ranks tenth 
for another indicium and eleventh for two additional criteria that the 
commissioners employed in calculating time to disposition.88 The most 
recent empirical data that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
gathered shows Sixth Circuit resolution times have lengthened and its 
comparative situation has deteriorated.89 
The Commission also ascertained that the court depended more 
heavily on visiting judges over the preceding half-decade period than 
any other tribunal.9 The relatively few published determinations and 
85 These were Judge Gilbert Merritt, a Democratic appointee, as well as Judges Alan 
Norris, Eugene Siler, and Richard Suhrheinrich, Republican appointees. See VACANCIES IN 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2001), supra note 84. 
86 See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
Working Papers, 93, tbl. 2 (1998); see also Commission on Structural Alternatives for the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, Final Report (1998). See generally Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense 
of Unpublished Opinions, 60 Omo ST. L. J. 177 (1999). 
87 Working Papers, supra note 86, at 93, tbl. 8. Chief Judge Martin emphasized: except 
for appeals resolved from the bench, all cases "terminated on the merits are accompanied 
by a statement of reasons for the decision. Unlike some of our sister circuits that claim a 
somewhat higher 'productivity' rate, the Sixth Circuit does not issue one word 'opinions' 
which simply state that the decision below is 'affirmed."' Statement of Chief Judge Boyce 
F. Martin, Jr., supra note 62, at 1. 
88 See Working Papers, supra note 86, at 95, tbl.7. The Sixth Circuit did surpass the 
system-wide average vis-a-vis the remaining two parameters deployed by the Commission. 
Id. 
89 See U.S. Courts of Appeals, Median Time Intervals in Cases Terminated After 
Hearing or Submission, By Circuit During the 12-Month Period Ending Sept. 30, 2001. 
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit presently resolves cases only a half month faster than the Ninth 
Circuit, rather than 2.2 months quicker, as the Sixth Circuit did in 1997. 
90 See Working Papers, supra note 86, at 96, tbl.8. Indeed, only eight of the 168 panels 
that the appeals court constituted in the 1997 fiscal year were comprised of three active 
Sixth Circuit appellate judges. See Sixth Circuit Analysis, supra note 65, at 3; accord 
Statement of Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., supra note 62, at 2 (asserting same). 
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the slow disposition times are instructive measures of appellate justice 
and efficacious performance. These measures involve critical process 
values, such as open court access, while placing substantial reliance on 
visitors can reduce judges' accountability, visibility and collegiality, limit 
fairness to litigants, and permit less consistent decisionmaking. Chief 
Judge Martin eloquently warned the Senate about these issues in the 
statement prepared at Senator Grassley's behest.91 
The Sixth Circuit does function effectively in terms of certain 
parameters. For instance, the Commission determined that the tribunal 
surpasses the nationwide average for provision of oral arguments by ten 
percentage points.92 Chief Judge Martin agreed that the court furnishes 
"arguments in a greater percentage of our docket than some of our sister 
circuits [and has] a long tradition of according oral argument unless the 
parties waive" it.93 He also remarked that the Sixth Circuit performs 
well, yet could operate better with two additional judgeships, which the 
Judicial Conference concluded its caseload supported.94 Moreover, the 
1999 report assembled by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Administrative Oversight and the Courts ascertained the tribunal 
functions efficiently and needs no more positions, while it noted that 
new seats should be created only after the court institutes alternative 
techniques to manage the circuit docket efficiently. Two examples that 
would increase efficiency are delegating greater responsibility to the 
tribunal's staff counsel and not permitting oral argument unless clearly 
warranted.95 
The Senate evaluation praised the court for instituting the practices 
meant to increase efficiency and enhance the administration of justice, 
which Chief Judge Martin documented in his written statement. The 
evaluation also lauded the "hard work of the Sixth Circuit's active and 
senior judges."96 The study's recommendation that the tribunal depend 
91 See supra note 62 and accompanying text; JUDITH MCKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND 
OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 9-12 (1993) (discussing real or 
perceived stress on courts); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. 
REV. 1463, 1466-71 (1987) (assessing numerous, important process values). 
92 See Working Papers, supra note 86, at 93, tbl. 2. 
93 See Working Papers, supra note 86, at 93, tbl.2; Statement of Chief Judge Boyce F. 
Martin, Jr., supra note 62, at 1. The Senate report found that the court's "policy of granting 
oral argument in so many cases significantly increases [its] workload" which could be 
reduced by doing so only when "truly necessary." Sixth Circuit Analysis supra note 65, at 
1,4. 
94 See Statement of Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., supra note 62, at 4-5. 
95 Sixth Circuit Analysis, supra note 65, at 1, 3. 
% See Sixth Circuit Analysis, supra note 65, at 2; Statement of Chief Judge Boyce F. 
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more on staff counsel and grant fewer oral arguments, however, could 
erode judicial accountability and visibility, increase bureaucratization 
and restrict court access, sentiments which Chief Judge Martin 
trenchantly articulated: 
We have resisted, and will continue to resist, the adoption of 
shortcut practices, such as the issuance of decisions that do not 
contain an explanation of the rationale of the decision, or increasing 
the reliance on the use of staff, rather than judges to prepare the 
decision of the court. We believe that our approach insures that 
judges will remain accountable for the exercise of their 
constitutional responsibilities.97 
Therefore, although certain raw information from the Commission 
indicates the Sixth Circuit may perform less well than it might, these 
data are essentially inconclusive and additional material suggests the 
tribunal operates rather effectively. 
D. A Word About State-Specific Developments 
The most crucial phenomenon implicating Michigan and Ohio is that 
few active judges, particularly Republican appointees, from these states 
now serve on the Sixth Circuit. Michigan GOP members and others who 
are concerned about the situation should not forget that Senator 
Abraham shares some responsibility for this circumstance. During the 
late 1990s, he prevented Judge White and Ms. Lewis from having 
Judiciary Committee hearings.98 The Senator and his Republican 
colleagues who represent states in the Sixth Circuit, such as Senator 
Mitchell McConnell (R-KY), may also have stopped Senate consideration 
of Kent Markus because they hoped George W. Bush would win the 2000 
presidential campaign.99 
Martin, Jr., supra note 62, at 3-4. 
"' See Statement of Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., supra note 62, at 4. Accord THOMAS 
E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEAL 14-
30 (1994) (noting ideals for appellate design); POSNER, supra note 27, at 26-28; CHRISTOPHER 
E. SMITH, JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL JUDGES AND COURT ADMINISTRATION 94-125 
(1995) (discussing growing judicial chambers and bureaucracy). The Senate Subcommittee 
Study's scope, dearth of empirical data, and political nature are controversial. However, 
the panel certainly possesses authority to monitor the appellate courts and their allocation 
of resources, and the subcommittee did attempt to collect some data and seek the views of 
judges that are informed by experience. 
" For developments in the Clinton Administration, see supra notes 83-84 and 
accompanying text. 
99 The Ohio senators apparently did not participate in this activity, but they may have 
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After Bush secured election, Senator Levin reportedly met with White 
House officials to suggest that he might support the GOP 
administration's nominees for Michigan vacancies if the two individuals 
proposed by President Clinton received hearings or if President Bush 
agreed to establish a bipartisan judicial nomination commission.100 In 
November 2001, Bush apparently responded by forwarding people for 
three empty Michigan seats and eight months later he tendered a person 
for the fourth opening.101 On May 9, 2001, the chief executive nominated 
two designees for the Ohio vacancies, and the following December 
submitted a name for the unfilled Kentucky seat. 102 Only the Kentucky 
nominee has received Senate confirmation thus far. 103 
It is critical that all states situated in every regional circuit have active 
appellate judges on the court whose chambers are located in the states, 
even though the Third Branch is not a representative institution. A jurist 
who is stationed in a specific jurisdiction will qften have greater 
familiarity with its substantive law, which can facilitate disposition of 
appeals that involve diversity of citizenship,104 and with the state's legal 
and other cultures, which may help to reconcile federal and local 
policies.105 Those living in a jurisdiction might also be more confident 
about, and more readily accept, the determinations of a court which has 
a resident judge. Indeed, when an appellate court includes no member 
deferred to it. See, e.g., Tom Brune, Roadblocks to justice: judgeships Unfilled as Congress 
Wrangles Over Appointees, NEWSDAY, May 9, 2002, at A46; Jack Torry, Court Nominations: 
Sitting in Limbo, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 30, 2001, at SA. 
100 See, e.g., Empty Chairs on the Bench, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 27, 2001, at A12; Carl 
Levin & Debbie Stabenow, Bipartisanship Can End fudge Stalemate, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, 
Dec. 5, 2001, at AlS; Ringel, supra note 83 (discussing Sixth Circuit stalemate); Pickler, supra 
note 83 (discussing same). 
101 v ACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2002), supra note 15; v ACANCIES IN THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2001), supra note 84; see also Ringel, supra note 83. 
102 See VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2001), supra note 84; Savage, supra note 
38. On July 29, 2002, the Senate did confirm Judge Julia Gibbons, whom President Reagan 
had first named to the Eastern District of Tennessee. See infra note 116 and accompanying 
text. 
103 See UK Professor Confirmed to Appeals Court, LoUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, Nov. 16, 
2002, at 1. 
104 See 135 CONG. REC. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatfield). "State 
law mastery" has become less critical in light of the comparatively few appeals taken in 
diversity cases. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 97, at 98 (explaining Ninth Circuit decided 255 
diversity appeals and over 5,800 federal question appeals); Carl Tobias, The Impoverished 
Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357, 1373 (1995). 
105 This is the regional circuits' federalizing function. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 10-13 (5th ed. 1994); John Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great 
Court, 26 LOY. L. REV. 787, 788 (1980) (arguing circuit splitting and adding judges dilutes 
federalizing function). 
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(or too few judges) from a state for an extended time, residents can 
become detached, and even alienated, from the regional circuits that 
enunciate a growing body of federal law which covers them. The above 
ideas will be magnified as docket increases and a shrunken Supreme 
Court caseload increasingly transform the appellate tribunals into the 
courts of last resort for their areas.106 The Senate has long respected the 
tradition whereby each jurisdiction in a regional circuit has a member 
serve on the court, while Congress found the notion so important that it 
recently received codification.107 
In sum, the previous analysis of the permanent vacancies dilemma and 
of the current dilemma indicates these components might have 
threatened the justice which the federal appeals courts deliver and that 
the problems require immediate attention. The Second Part, therefore, 
canvasses numerous measures which officers in every branch of the 
federal government could implement to treat the complications. 
II. ANALYSIS OF PREFERABLE SOLUTIONS 
A. The Executive Branch and the Senate 
The President and the Senate must make concerted efforts to fulfill 
their respective selection duties.108 For instance, the Bush Administration 
and the upper chamber should attempt to streamline those 
responsibilities each discharges. They should also balance assessment of 
nominee competence and character with the necessity for facilitating the 
confirmation process. 
Executive and legislative branch officials must confront politicization's 
growth and appreciate that attempts to surmount it will prove 
controversial and could be fruitless. The officials should cooperate, 
strive to accommodate their different perspectives, and amicably resolve 
disputes that materialize. The officials must also discontinue certain 
behavior, such as blaming one another - conduct apparently motivated 
106 See POSNER, supra note 27, at 58-64, 80-81, 194-95 (documenting growth of appeals 
and Supreme Court's shrunken docket); Hellman, supra note 27 (documenting Supreme 
Court's shrunken docket). 
107 See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 307, 111 Stat. 2493 (1997); 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (1994). 
108 See supra note 4. The persistent dilemma's best solution seems to be approval of 
enough new seats to accord the bench every judge now authorized because this would 
avoid numerous theoretical, practical, and legal difficulties. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 569-
70. Other approaches may only limit effectively irreducible temporal restraints. For 
exposition of many remedies, some of which apply to the Sixth Circuit, see id. at 552-73. 
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by gamesmanship and near-term political advantage. To the extent 
politicization hampers appointments and fosters the perception that 
public officers are subverting the best interests of the judiciary and the 
nation for immediate, partisan benefit, the actions might diminish 
respect for the process and its participants. 
These notions pertain to Sixth Circuit as well as Michigan and Ohio 
selection. For example, the chief executive should cooperate with 
senators throughout the region by informally consulting them before he 
actually tenders names. The choice of someone for the tribunal's next 
vacant position affords an excellent opportunity to secure advice from 
Senate members. Bush should maintain open lines of communication, 
even after nomination, and redouble efforts to break the Michigan 
logjam. All senators who represent jurisdictions of the Sixth Circuit 
should closely confer on significant matters, including whether they will 
continue to approve judges from the same states as seats become empty. 
Senators in each jurisdiction must work together and identify an 
acceptable designee when a vacancy arises. They might also think about 
establishing an intrastate merit-selection panel, which would be 
analogous to the Circuit Judge Nominating Commission instituted by 
President Jimmy Carter, the entity that Michigan's senators proposed,109 
or the district group which the Bush Administration and the California 
Senate members formed last year.110 That idea may rectify or ameliorate 
the difficulties in Michigan and Ohio, especially when the chamber 
remains closely divided. 
B. The Executive Branch 
The administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush bear certain 
responsibility for the present openings.111 Although Bush has now 
apparently tendered sufficient, competent designees who possess 
moderate political perspectives for the Judiciary Committee to consider, 
he must continue forwarding similar nominees at a pace which will 
109 See, e.g., LARRY c. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE 
NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1980); Elaine 
Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan and Carter Administrations, 
71JUDICATURE136, 140 (1988). See generally Tobias, supra note 28, at 1259-60. 
110 See Carla Marinucci, Feinstein, Boxer Given A Say Over Judges, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, Apr. 27, 2001, at A3; Henry Weinstein, Process of Judge Selection Set Up Courts, 
L.A. llMES, May 30, 2001, at Bl. 
111 In early 1997 and 2001, each tendered few nominees, many of whom were qualified 
and relatively moderate, but Hatch and Leahy claimed some were not. See supra notes 35-
38, 41-44 and accompanying text. 
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expedite panel review. In fairness, he may have exercised caution to 
avoid those missteps that can undermine a new administration's 
credibility, slow the process, and even.jeopardize appointments. 
The chief executive must assess and implement cooperative 
approaches, as the measures could prove effective. Moreover, he can 
depend on their previous use, should resort to more confrontational 
possibilities become necessary. Bush must follow practices that will 
improve the discharge of administration responsibilities. For instance, 
the President could facilitate nominations by assembling candidates for 
all existing and anticipated appellate court vacancies. 112 He should also 
reexamine the decision to abrogate early ABA participation, because this 
determination has fostered delay.113 Another conciliatory notion is 
submitting more people Democrats will find acceptable. For example, 
the Senate expeditiously confirmed Bush's choice of Judge Barrington 
Parker, whom Clinton had first placed on the Southern District of New 
York. 114 Elevation is concomitantly a time-honored measure, as senators 
oppose few district judges nominated for appellate seats.115 Indeed, 
Judge Julia Gibbons, who is the first person Bush named to the Sixth 
Circuit, was a Reagan district court appointee.116 
The chief executive should at least consider proposing additional 
capable lawyers with Democratic party affiliations.117 This concept may 
be productive for tribunals which have substantial dockets and 
protracted openings and are in jurisdictions that regularly elect 
Democrats or have two Democratic senators. Illustrative is Maryland, 
whose senators halted the nomination of a Bush designee because the 
112 Bush could enhance nomination and confirmation through consultation with the 
Committee and with senators and by implementing a merit-selection commission. See supra 
notes 109-10 and accompanying text. 
113 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text; see also Leahy statement, supra note 47 
(discussing delay in appointment procedure). 
11
' This happened because Parker had been confirmed once, had Democratic support, 
and had served as a district judge, which informed analysis of his competence and 
character. The decision resembled Clinton's elevation of Judge Sonia Sotomayor whom 
Bush's father had named. See Neil Lewis, After Delay, Senate Approves fudge for Court in New 
York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at B3. 
115 Reagan, Clinton and Bush, Sr. relied on the technique of elevation. See Tobias, supra 
note 48, at 742-43; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of fudges Reagan Favored, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 1990, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Bush Quietly Fosters Conservative Trend in Courts, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 18, 1991, at A4; supra note 114. 
11
• See, e.g., James Brosnan, Senate Confirms Gibbons 95-0 for Appeals Bench, MEMPHIS 
COMMERCIAL APPEAL, July 30, 2002, at B2; Editorial, At Last, A Beginning, CINCINNATI POST, 
July 31, 2002, at 12A. 
117 See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 38, 114 and 
accompanying text (discussing other presidents' selection methods). 
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individual had never practiced there and the President failed to consult 
them, as well as the Sixth Circuit, with its large caseload and six 
vacancies.118 Several reasons, principally political differences between 
the two political parties, explain the numerous "Michigan seats" which 
are empty.119 For courts that experience increasing dockets and multiple, 
lengthy openings, which are in states where those who suggest or can 
stop nominees are stalemated, the chief executive might contemplate 
exchanges, namely permitting Democratic recommendations of half as 
many people as Republicans.120 Bush could even allow Democrats to 
propose nominees in return for judgeships legislation and, therefore, 
inaugurate a bipartisan judiciary, a notion which may resolve the current 
impasse.121 He might correspondingly strike an accord with the Judiciary 
Committee Chair and the ranking minority member on a grearranged 
number of designees who would secure approval each year.1 
If cooperative efforts to improve the process are not successful, the 
chief executive could also analyze and use rather confrontational 
techniques. For example, Bush might employ his office as a bully pulpit 
to blame the Senate minority or to provoke more action by senators, and 
he could force the question if he took the issue to the public. Analogous 
measures are the nomination of attorneys for each vacancy or the 
selective application of recess appointments, practices which might 
pressure the Senate by publicizing or dramatizing how confirmation 
disputes and prolonged vacancies can slow justice's delivery. The 
Clinton recess appointment of Judge Roger Gregory to the Fourth Circuit 
apparently facilitated his subsequent approval, but this was an unusual 
circumstance and significant legal, political, and pragmatic factors 
us For analysis of Maryland, see Lewis, supra note 33; Carl Tobias, The Bush 
Administration and Appeals Court Nominees, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 103, 110, 114 (2001); 
supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
'" See Jonathan Groner & Jonathan Ringel, Judicial Nominee Horsetrading Heats Up As 
Confirmation Process Gets Weighed, AM. LAW MEDIA, Sept. 4, 2001; Senate Nomination Process 
Needs Repair, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 4, 2002, at AS; The Federal Court Blockade, GRAND RAPIDS 
PRE.ss, May 12, 2002, at G2. 
120 Senator Biden suggested that the GOP contemplated a similar "informal agreement" 
yet claimed this violated a two-century tradition. 143 CONG. REC. 52538, 52541 (daily ed. 
Mar. 19, 1997); see also sources cited supra note 41 (discussing appointment delays). 
"Horsetrading" judgeships is quite controversial. See Groner & Ringel, supra note 119. 
121 See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 37, at 271. President Eisenhower made a similar 
offer in 1960. See id.; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text (affording judgeships bill 
and Judicial Conference proposals). 
122 I do not urge Bush to use the approaches mentioned in this paragraph, but he 
should assess them and be pragmatic about confirming judges. Bush might consider how 
important vacancies are and decide that filling the bench is less critical than specific 
principles, such as naming the type of judges he prefers. 
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restrict recess appointments' efficacy.123 Bush has relied on, or 
threatened the invocation of, these mechanisms, particularly to leverage 
Democratic senators.124 However, the chief executive has cautiously used 
them and he has voiced concern about preserving a dignified process.125 
These ideas apply to the Sixth Circuit and states within it. For 
example, consultation is a cost-free approach on which the President 
should depend. Insofar as limited consultation, or failure to consider 
any advice given, fostered submission of several nominees for the 
"Michigan seats" whom the state's Democratic senators apparently find 
unacceptable, Bush might broach future designees with those senators or 
accord their perspectives greater weight.126 
C. The Senate 
All senators must analyze and implement conciliatory approaches 
because they are as responsible as Presidents Clinton and Bush for the 
present situation. Republicans should bear in mind that the Democratic 
Senate actually approved more judges, despite how politicized 
appointments were, when the GOP occupied the White House.127 
Democrats might remember that the people may blame them for 
problems attributable to J;rotracted openings and that Republicans have 
recaptured the chamber.1 
The minority, thus, should invoke cooperative techniques. It must be 
responsive to administration endeavors, with effective consultation, 
which provides candid, informative views on potential nominees, and 
expeditious confirmation of all Clinton appointees whom Bush may 
propose for elevation. Numerous conciliatory measures are also 
available. For example, when Democratic senators find GOP designees 
unacceptable, they should recommend more palatable compromise 
123 For example, if the Senate had not confirmed Circuit Judge Gregory, what effect 
would have been accorded the opinions that the jurist authored or joined? See United 
States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1012-14 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing effect of recess 
appointments); Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of 
Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1758 (1984). 
124 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 49. 
125 See Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Are Pushed on Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 
2001, at Al, p. 22; see also sources cited supra note 49. 
126 See sources cited supra notes 98-99, 116. Insofar as the Ohio nominees' perceived 
political views have prompted interest group opposition and delay, Bush may want to 
consider submitting more moderate designees and he should be realistic about the 
influence the groups can wield. See supra notes 76, 83 and accompanying text. 
127 See supra note 48 and accompanying text; Hartley & Holmes, supra note 25, at 277-78. 
128 See sources cited supra notes 33, 49. 
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candidates.129 
To the extent that delayed consideration has left seats empty, the 
Senate leadership and specific senators should employ mechanisms that 
speed appointments. For instance, the Judiciary Committee might 
conduct hearings and vote on additional nominees with rather limited 
scrutiny and perhaps abolish basically ceremonial sessions for those who 
are not controversial. Insofar as Senator Leahy slowed processing of 
individuals nominated due to their perceived ideological perspectives, 
longstanding norms and considerable actual practice since 1990 indicates 
that persons should receive hearings and panel votes.130 The Majority 
Leader should implement efforts which will facilitate full Senate 
evaluation. For example, Senator William Frist (R-TN) could provide 
votes on larger numbers of nominees by scheduling floor consideration 
soon after he learns about Committee approval. To the extent that 
disputes over particular designees created delay, the Majority Leader 
might permit greater floor debate and more final votes on them. 131 
Senators must calibrate the necessity for exacting assessment and 
prompt confirmation, approving nominees who possess the requisite 
qualifications to be superb jurists. Democrats could examine whether 
they are overvaluing political views just as GOP Senate members should 
have eschewed the quixotic venture to ascertain if nominees would be 
"activist judges."132 The concept of advice and consent in Article III 
contemplates that senators will analyze whether candidates are capable 
and honest, as well as comprehend and respect separation of powers. 
However, senators should not slow processing to probe how a nominee, 
if approved, might resolve individual appeals, because this could 
129 In 1997, Washington Senators Slade Gorton (R) and Patty Murray (D) agreed on a 
process to suggest designees. See Callaghan, supra note 41. Hatch should reconcile 
disputes over process and nominees, mediating intractable ones, perhaps with help from 
Senators Leahy or Daschle. 
130 See supra notes 48, 77 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 35-39 and 
accompanying text. The votes against Judges Owen and Pickering may be "paybacks," but 
they did receive hearings. See supra note 49. Now that Bush has tendered sufficient, 
acceptable names to facilitate processing, he should receive less criticism. 
131 The Senate confirmation debate on Circuit Judges Merrick Garland, Marsha Berzon 
and William Fletcher included some candid, healthy interchange. See 143 CONG. REC. 
S2515-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (Garland); 144 CONG. REC. S11872 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) 
(Berzon and Fletcher); see also Neil A. Lewis, After Long Delays, Senate Confirms 2 Judicial 
Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at A16. 
132 See, e.g., Should Ideology Matter?: Judicial Nominations 2001, Hearing Before the 
Senate Judiciary Subcomm. On Admin. Oversight & the Courts, June 26, 2001; Hearings on 
Judicial Activism: Assessing the Impact Before the Senate Judiciary Constitution 
Subcomrn., July 15, 1997; 143 CONG. REC. S2515 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch); see also sources cited supra notes 25, 47. 
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jeopardize courts' independence.133 
Democrats may also want to think about confirming people whose 
ability and character would make them fine judges, as Republican 
senators often so acted when they had a majority and there was a 
Democratic president.134 Some Democrats remain concerned about how 
the GOP delayed Clinton nominees, while certain Republicans harbor 
similar resentment over Justice Thomas's bitter confirmation fight and 
Senate rejection of Judge Bork, behavior which they found animated 
primarily by opposition to the jurists' substantive decision making.135 
A number of these notions implicate the Sixth Circuit as well as 
Michigan and Ohio. Senator Stabenow's 2000 victory has enhanced 
cooperation within the Michigan Senate delegation. She could even help 
end the standoff, which has precluded President Bush from filling any of 
the state's numerous empty seats and which denied the two Clinton 
nominees Judiciary Committee hearings.136 For instance, if Bush suggests 
one of them, Senators Stabenow and Levin might organize Democratic 
support for several Bush designees.137 Should all Democrats and a few 
Republicans oppose the two rather controversial Ohio nominees, a 
similar· arrangement may be warranted there.138 
D. The Judicial Branch 
Members of the federal bench have less ability than political branch 
officials to improve the existing situation because the Constitution 
assigns the chief executive and the Senate greater responsibility for 
selection. However, the judiciary could increase efforts to publicize 
133 See, e.g., UNCERTAIN JUSTICE POLffiCS AND AMERICA'S COURTS 1-75, 121-71, 205-42 
(2000). See generally Symposium, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
311 (1999). 
134 See supra notes 48, 77 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 35-39 and 
accompanying text. 
135 See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 37, at 256; Melone, supra note 5, at 68; Gest et al., 
supra note 55; see also MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE (1992) (chronicling rejection 
of Bork as judicial appointee because of his subjective rulings); PAUL SIMON, ADVISE AND 
CONSENT (1992). Democrats could argue that High Court selection is unique and that they 
rarely so assessed lower court nominees. See 143 CONG. REC. S2538-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 
1997) (statements of Sen. Biden & Sen. Sarbanes). 
136 See supra notes 83, 98-101 and accompanying text. 
137 North Carolina has a similar situation. Senator John Edwards (D) delayed blocking 
Judge Terrence Boyle's Fourth Circuit appointment, until Edwards could discuss with Bush 
possible nomination of Judge James Wynn, a Clinton nominee. See Matthew Cooper & 
Douglas Waller, Bush's Judicial Picks Could Be a Battle Boyle, nME, May 21, 2001, at 22. 
138 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. 
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openings and the severe difficulties that those openings create.139 The 
courts should also develop salutary approaches for facilitating 
appointments that the president and senators might implement. 
Several concepts I explained earlier pertain to the Sixth Circuit. For 
example, Chief Judge Martin claimed that the tribunal functions well 
with the present judicial complement but could operate better with a few 
more positions.140 A majority of active circuit judges urged Congress to 
authorize additional seats.141 The court's members positively answered, 
in the highest percentages, the Commission survey questions whether 
enlarging the circuit would help the tribunal "avoid a backlog" and 
"write a statement of reasons for all decisions in nonfrivolous appeals."142 
With all due respect, the small percentage of published opinions which 
the Sixth Circuit provides, its relatively slow disposition times, and the 
court's substantial reliance on visiting judges suggest that the tribunal 
might dispense greater appellate justice or at least work more effectively, 
were new positions authorized.143 Thus, those Sixth Circuit members 
who oppose expansion may want to reconsider whether the court would 
function better using additional judges.144 
CONCLUSION 
Protracted vacancies can erode the delivery of appellate justice. The 
difficulty comprises a persistent complication and a current dilemma, 
which is in essence political and which public officials could remedy if 
they exercised sufficient political will. The Bush Administration and 
senators should attempt to expedite and depoliticize appointments. 
They might cease or reduce criticism of each other, accommodate 
139 This could increase public awareness of, and may galvanize support to ameliorate, 
the vacancies problem and perhaps accentuate executive and legislative branch officials 
sensitivity to the critical need for expedition. 
140 See supra notes 63, 94 and accompanying text; see also supra note 66 and 
accompanying text. 
141 Some judges did dissent. See Sixth Circuit Analysis, supra note 65; Tobias, supra note 
48, at 749 (explaining process for Judicial Conference recommendations of additional 
positions). 
142 See Working Papers, supra note 83, at 18, 21. The conservative estimates on which 
the Judicial Conference bases judgeship proposals suggest the court needs new seats. See 
S.1145, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing two new Sixth Circuit positions); see also Tobias, 
supra note 48, at 753. But see Grassley's Report, supra note 61, at 2-7. 
143 See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. 
144 These are disputed, unresolved issues. See supra notes 63-67, 86-97 and 
accompanying text. Of course, the authorization of new positions will prove to be an 
empty gesture, unless judges can be appointed to the seats. 
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partisan disagreements, and ameliorate the existing problem for the 
benefit of the courts and the country. The Senate Majority and Minority 
Leaders, the Judiciary Committee Chair as well as Attorney General John 
Ashcroft and White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales should lead this 
endeavor. 
Senators who represent each jurisdiction located in the Sixth Circuit 
must facilitate cooperation there, among themselves and with President 
Bush. The election of the 108th Senate could represent a new beginning 
and facilitate greater cooperation between the chamber and the chief 
executive. If senators from Sixth Circuit states and the President consult 
on the above ideas, they can enhance the federal appeals court 
appointments process in these jurisdictions, the Sixth Circuit, and 
perhaps the nation. 
